Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company :
Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Allan L. Larson; Craig L. Barlow; Anne Swensen; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Stephen J.
Sorensen; Assistant Attorney General; J. Clare Williams; Larry A Gatenbein; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Michael A. Katz; Burbidge & Mitchell; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




J CLARE WILLIAMS 
DENNIS C FARLEY 
LARRVA GANTENBEIN 
General Attorneys 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
LAW DEPARTMENT 
March 27 , 1991 
#[()01->J> 
406 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801)595-3226 
Fax (801) 595-3265 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
MAR 2 7 1991 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Re: Lewis Duncan et al v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company et al - Case No. 900233 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
In accordance with Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company hereby draws 
the Court's attention to a recent decision of the U.S. District 
Court, Northern District of Oklahoma, in Conner v. Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Company, Case No. 90-C-562-E. The decision was 
only filed on March 14, 1991, and, therefore, does not yet have a 
reporter system citation. Accordingly, a copy of the Court's 
decision is attached hereto. 
The decision interprets the Federal Rail Safety Act of 
1970, 45 USC § 421 et seq. regarding the issue of federal preemp-
tion of common law duties to install warning devices at railway 
crossings in light of a recent U.S. Supreme decision which 
reiterates in general the doctrine of federal preemption. The 
case pertains to the arguments set forth in Union Pacific's brief 
at pages 26-34. 
JCW:k 
cc: Michael A. Katz, Esq. 
Allan L. Larson, Esq, 
Stephen J. Sorensen, Esq. 
KLLLIYtLU MAR \ 5 UW 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
GARY DEAN CONNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY d/b/a UNION PACIFIC 




F I L E D 
MAR 141991 
Jade C Silver, Clerk 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
O R D E R 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion in Limine. Both 
motions pertain to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant is liable for 
the allegedly inadequate warning devices at the railroad crossing 
where the accident at issue occurred. 
The gist of Defendant's argument is that the Federal Rail 
Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §421 et s§g. (FRSA), has pre-empted 
state statutory and common law duties relative to railway safety 
and, specifically, as it relates to warning devices at railway 
crossings. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that Defendant is liable 
for inadequate warning devices at the crossing should be dismissed. 
And Defendant further argues that evidence regarding the adequacy 
of warning signals at the crossing should be deemed inadmissible 
pursuant to 23 U.S.C. S409, 45 U.S.C. S421 e£ geg., 23 U.S.C. §401 
e£ seq. and 17 O.S. §86. 
Plaintiff's response, in sum, is that: 1) there is no federal 
pre-emption of Oklahoma's state and common law by FRSA; or 2) 
alternatively, pre-emption has not occurred where, as here, the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission has not inspected the crossing at 
issue for the purpose of determining what warning signals would be 
adequate; or, finally, 3) the savings clause of 45 U.S.C. §434 is 
applicable to the crossing at issue, because it is a local safety 
hazard as to which state law continues in force. Finally, 
Plaintiff argues that as to Defendant's Motion in Limine, 23 U.S.C. 
§401 does not preclude the testimony of expert witnesses. 
Mindful of the teachings of Celotex Core, v. Catrett.1 the 
Court has considered the arguments of the parties and reviewed the 
relevant law. The Court has also adopted the undisputed material 
facts as urged by the parties2 with one exception: the Court finds 
that the issue of whether FRSA has pre-empted state statutory and 
common law concerning warning devices at railroad crossings is not 
a fact, disputed or otherwise, but an issue of law for the Court's 
determination. 
Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the Doctrine of Federal 
Pre-emption. English v. General Electric Co,. U.S. , 
110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). The English court noted 
that pre-emption "fundamentally is a question of congressional 
intent,w and can occur under one of three scenarios. Ifl. at 110 
*476 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). 
2See Brief in Support of Defendants Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 2-3; Plaintiff *s Response to Defendant's Motion 
in Limine and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with Brief 
Included at 1-2. 
2 
S.Ct. 2275. "First Congress can define explicitly the extent to 
which its enactments pre-empt state law ... and when Congress has 
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the 
Court's task is an easy one." Id. "second, in the absence of 
explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it 
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively. I£. Here, Congressional intent 
is evinced when federal regulation pervades the field. "Finally, 
state law is pre-empted to the extant that it actually conflicts 
with federal law." Id. 
The threshold question for this Court is whether the issue 
before it fits within any of the scenarios identified above. The 
Court finds that the express legislative purpose3 and the explicit 
statutory language of the FRSA make it clear that Congress intended 
to supersede existing state statutory schemes in the regulation of 
railway crossing warning devices. 
Next, the Court must determine when pre-emption under FRSA is 
triggered. 45 U.S.C. §434 provides, in relevant part, that 
A state may adopt or continue in force any 
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time as 
the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, 
order or standard covering the subject matter 
of such state requirement. 
The pivotal event, then, is the promulgation by the Secretary 
of the Department of Transportation of the requisite regulations 
and standards. The parties agree, and the Court concurs, that the 
3For an exposition of FRSA's legislative history, see 1970 
U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News at 4104. 
3 
event has taken place/ The fact that the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission, as the relevant public authority, has made no 
determination or recommendation concerning the adequacy of the 
warning devices of the crossing at issue is not germane to the 
analysis* The Court therefore declines to adopt the reasoning of 
the Eighth Circuit in Karl v. Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company,5 holding, inter alia that FRSA did not pre-empt state law 
on the issue; and the Ninth Circuit in Marshall v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc.6 holding, in part, that the event which triggers 
pre-emption in this arena is the determination by the local 
authority of the proper warning device for the particular crossing 
at issue. 
Finally, the Court must consider whether the facts of this 
case present an exception to FRSA pre-emption under the savings 
clause of §434. The savings clause provides that 
A State may adopt or continue in force an 
additional or more stringent law, rule, 
regulation, order, or standard when necessary 
to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety hazard and when not incompatible with 
any Federal law, rule, regulation, order or 
standard, and when not creating an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. 
Nothing in the record convinces the Court that the facts of this 
case fit within the very narrow exception to pre-emption carved out 
4See Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 3, undisputed facts nos. 8, 9, 10; Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment with Brief Included. 
5880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989). 
*720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (1983). 
4 
by the savings clause. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds 
that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be 
granted. The Court further finds that Defendant's Motion in Limine 
is, therefore, moot. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion in Limine is 
denied as moot. 
ORDERED this /&— day of March, 1991. 
JAMES yfif ELLISON 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
5 
